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Abstract
This paper investigates the e⁄ects of a ￿scal stimulus when ￿nancial frictions and a
liquidity trap are present. These two conditions make a government spending expansion
and a reduction in capital income taxes more e¢ cient in stimulating output. In contrast,
a reduction in labor income taxes may aggravate the economic conditions. In addition,
small implementation delays in government spending may result in big spending mul-
tipliers in the short run. All of these results rely partly on the dynamic interaction
between in￿ ation and the external ￿nance premium. Lastly, simulations of the ARRA
stimulus package predict that the output gains due to the presence of ￿nancial frictions
may lie between 1.3 % and 2.5 % of GDP.
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11 Introduction
The severe recession of 2008-2010 has prompted monetary and ￿scal authorities to under-
take drastic policies. One is the reduction of the target short run nominal interest rate
by di⁄erent central banks to record low levels. In the United States, for instance, the fed
funds rate has been set to between 0 and 0.25 per cent since December 2008. In addi-
tion, various governments have implemented important ￿scal packages aimed at stimulating
their economies. In U.S., the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) plans to
distribute 787 billion dollars (around 5.5 per cent of 2009 GDP) in the course of the next
few years. In a context of ￿nancial turmoil, the role of ￿nancial frictions might be crucial
in the analysis of monetary and ￿scal policy. Indeed, a few studies suggest that ￿nancial
accelerator mechanisms ￿in which ￿rms balance sheet positions a⁄ect the cost of external
￿nance ￿are relatively more important during recessions than during booms.1
In this paper, we investigate the e⁄ect of ￿scal stimulus packages on an economy featuring
￿nancial frictions that enters into a liquidity trap. Speci￿cally, we are interested in the
potential implication that ￿nancial frictions may have in the ￿scal multiplier. The ￿scal
stimulus package that we consider consists of either an increase in government spending, or
a cut in distortionary labor and capital income taxes.
The e⁄ect of government spending expansions in a zero nominal interest rate environment
has been explored in the literature. For instance, Christiano et al. (2009a) argue that
the impact of government spending on output can be large when the zero lower bound is
binding. Indeed, the well-known crowding-out of investment by government spending is
neutralized when the interest rate stays close to zero for an extended period of time. The
1For instance, Christiano et al. (2003) used a ￿nancial accelerator model ￿ la Bernanke et al. (2000) to
study the Great depression in the U.S.. Gertler et al. (2007) employed a similar strategy for the Korean
economy to the Asian ￿nancial crisis of 1997. Finally, Peersman and Smets (2005), using European industry
data, showed that the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism can explain the asymmetric e⁄ects of monetary policy
during booms and recessions.
2reason behind this result lies in the fact that the rise in in￿ ation, led by the ￿scal stimulus,
reduces the real interest rate when the nominal rate remains ￿xed. Erceg and LindØ (2010)
showed that the size of the ￿scal stimulus matters for the value of the ￿scal multiplier. They
demonstrated that massive government spending expansions might substantially reduce the
duration of the liquidity trap that automatically turns on the crowding-out e⁄ect on invest-
ment.2 Furthermore, FernÆndez-Villaverde (2010) assessed the impact of a ￿scal stimulus
in an economy featuring ￿nancial frictions. He concluded that credit market imperfections
magnify the e⁄ect of government spending on output. This holds since, by increasing in￿ a-
tion, government spending indirectly improves the balance sheet position of ￿rms, which in
turn reduces the external ￿nance premium.
Given these results, we suspected that the presence of ￿nancial frictions and of zero short-
term interest rates would reinforce the ￿nal e⁄ects of a ￿scal stimulus. In this environment,
our contribution is to explore how ￿scal multipliers react to di⁄erent ￿scal policy regimes.
This allows the policy responses that are best-suited to an economy su⁄ering from a liq-
uidity trap and credit market imperfections to be identi￿ed. To pursue our analysis, we
use a ￿nancial accelerator model with nominal and real rigidities, plus a zero lower bound
constraint on the nominal interest rate. We use the ￿nancial frictions model ￿ la Bernanke
et al. (2000), enriched by the nominal-denominated debt contracts introduced by Chris-
tiano et al. (2009b) and FernÆndez-Villaverde (2010).3 The latter introduced an additional
transmission device, which is similar to the debt-de￿ ation channel that Fisher (1933) used
2Corsetti et al. (2010) show that the positive impact of the so-called ￿spending reversal￿on output can be
large when the zero lower bound is binding, once it is undertaken su¢ ciently late on the recovery path. Other
authors have assessed the e⁄ects of government spending expansion under the zero lower bound. Focusing on
changes in policy regimes, Eggertsson (2006) argues that monetary and ￿scal policy coordination can induce
a shift in expectations, that helps the economy to recover when the short-term nominal interest rate is close
to zero.
3The ￿nancial accelerator model ￿ la Bernanke et al. (2000) has been extensively employed to explore
the ampli￿cation e⁄ects of ￿nancial frictions (see Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002; Meier and M￿ller, 2006; Faia,
2007; Christensen and Dib, 2008). More recently, some authors have investigated the relative importance
of ￿nancial shocks over the business cycle by estimating the ￿nancial accelerator model (Christiano et al.,
2003, 2009b; Fuentes-Albero, 2009; Gilchrist et al., 2009; Nolan and Thoenissen, 2009; Queijo von Heideken,
2009).
3to explain the worsening of economic conditions during the Great Depression.
In this framework, a hypothetical recession is generated from a sudden decrease in the net
worth of entrepreneurs and a shift from spending to saving by households (i.e., a prefer-
ence shock). Then, we explore the role of di⁄erent ￿scal policies aimed at either expanding
government purchases or cutting the income tax rates. We assess the role of ￿nancial fric-
tions and the liquidity trap on the ￿scal multipliers by carrying out a set of counterfactual
exercises. In addition, we pay attention to the role of di⁄erent ￿scal regimes on govern-
ment spending multipliers. First, we consider automatic stabilizers and debt stabilization
by allowing for dynamic income tax rates. Second, we stress the impact of delays in the
implementation of government spending expansion on the ￿scal policy e¢ ciency. Finally,
we perform a quantitative exercise by introducing the ARRA ￿scal stimulus of 2009 as
approximated by Cogan et al. (2010).
Our main results are as follows. First, the Fisher e⁄ect, along with ￿nancial frictions, plays a
crucial role in the e¢ ciency of ￿scal policy. For instance, a government spending expansion
and a capital income tax cut see their e⁄ects ampli￿ed, because these measures increase
in￿ ation, which in turn reduces the external ￿nance premium. On the contrary, a cut in
the labor income tax rate can result in short-term negative multipliers. Indeed, this policy
increases the labor supply that lowers real wages and in turn in￿ ation. Consequently, the
debt-de￿ ation channel operates in the opposite direction reducing investment.
Second, we ￿nd that when there is ￿nancial friction, announcing the path of government
spending a few quarters in advance can increase the size of the ￿scal multiplier in the short
run. This is due to the fact that agents adjust their in￿ ation expectations upwards from
the present period. This activates the debt-de￿ ation channel by increasing net worth and
decreasing the risk premium, since in￿ ation starts rising from today.
Lastly, we emphasize that the ARRA ￿scal stimulus has more e¢ cient e⁄ects in the presence
4of ￿nancial frictions than without. Its e⁄ect on GDP was greatest in 2010, with an increase
in GDP of about 0:62%. This e⁄ect is even stronger when the zero lower bound lasts for 12
quarters instead of 6.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 elaborates on its
calibration and explains the solution method when the interest rate is equal to zero. Section
4 analyzes the e⁄ects of government spending expansion and income tax cuts. Section
5 assesses the importance of ￿scal policy regimes on the spending multiplier. Section 6
simulates the ARRA ￿scal stimulus in the model. Finally, some concluding remarks are
o⁄ered in Section 7.
2 The Model
The framework is based on a standard New-Keynesian model with real and nominal rigidi-
ties, which is enriched with frictions in the credit market ￿ la Bernanke et al. (2000). The
model also features the Fisher￿ s debt-de￿ ation channel, since we assume that debt contracts
are denominated in nominal terms.
In addition, we incorporate the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate,
which adds an important non-linearity to the model. Regarding ￿scal policy, distortionary
tax rules on labor and capital income are included. Consequently, a ￿scal stimulus package
is undertaken by expanding government spending or by lowering income tax rates.
2.1 Households
Preferences The economy is inhabited by a continuum of di⁄erentiated households, in-
dexed by i 2 [0;1]. A typical household selects a sequence of consumption, wages, and
savings that are deposited in a ￿nancial intermediary that pays the riskless rate of return.
Households di⁄er the speci￿c labor type they are endowed with, which gives them monop-
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where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information available in period t;
￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor; b 2 [0;1) is the habit parameter; ￿w
t is the
time-varying labor income tax rate; ct denotes real consumption; Pt is the price of ￿nal
goods; wi;t ￿ Wi;t=Pt and ‘h
i;t denote the real wage and the labor supply of type-i household
at period t; ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1 ￿ 1 is the in￿ ation rate; dt equals Dt=Pt￿1, where Dt denotes
the nominal deposits carried over from period t ￿ 1 and maturing in period t; Rt denotes
the riskless gross nominal interest rate; divt are real pro￿ts redistributed by monopolistic
￿rms; and ￿t denotes real lump-sum taxes adjusted according to the rule speci￿ed below.
In addition, "t denotes a preference shock which follows an autorregressive process of the
form
log("t) = ￿" log("t￿1) + ￿";t;
where ￿" 2 (0;1), and ￿";t ￿ i.i.d.(0;￿"). The ￿rst order conditions with respect to con-
sumption and deposits are quite standard and are omitted for simplicity.4
Wage Setting Type-i household is a monopoly supplier of type-i labor. Following Erceg
et al. (2000), we assume that the set of di⁄erentiated labor inputs, indexed by i 2 [0;1],
is aggregated into a single labor input ‘h
t by a competitive labor intermediary. Her pro￿t
4The log-linear model is described in appendix A.









where ￿w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two labor types and Wt is the
aggregate wage level.5
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that at each point in time a household has a probability
(1 ￿ ￿w) of re-optimizing its wage. Wages that are not allowed to re-optimize at time t
can be partially indexed to the most recently available in￿ ation measure, ￿t￿1. Let W?
i;t
denote the nominal wage rate chosen by type-i household at time t, and ‘h?
i;t+k the hours
worked k periods after the last period during which the type-i household re-optimized its
wage. Type-i household selects W?
i;t in order to maximize her expected lifetime utility with


















where ￿t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated the budget constraint; V‘ (￿) denotes the
derivative of V(￿) w.r.t. ‘h; w?
i;t ￿ W?
i;t=Pt is the time t optimal real wage; ￿w = ￿w=(￿w ￿ 1)
denotes the wage mark-up; and ￿w
t+k equals ￿T￿1
j=t (1 + ￿)1￿￿w(1 + ￿j)￿w when k > 0 and 1
otherwise, where ￿w 2 (0;1) is the degree of partial indexation, and ￿ is the steady-state
in￿ ation rate.















Optimal Financial Contract There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs, in-
dexed by e 2 [0;1]. At time t, type-e entrepreneur purchases at price Qt the stock of capital
~ ke;t+1 for use in t + 1. Capital expenditure is ￿nanced from internal resources and debt.
Let ne;t+1 be the available real net worth of type-e entrepreneur at the end of period t and
be;t+1 the amount of real debt owed to the ￿nancial intermediary (or lender). Accordingly,
qt~ ke;t+1 = be;t+1 + ne;t+1; (4)
where qt ￿ Qt=Pt. The lender is also risk neutral and obtains its funds from the households,
to whom she pays back the principal plus interest earnings according to the riskless real
gross rate of return, rt = Rt=Et(1 + ￿t+1). Following Bernanke et al. (2000), it is assumed
that the ex-post real gross return on capital for type-e entrepreneur, rk
e;t+1, is a⁄ected by an
idiosyncratic disturbance, denoted by !e;t+1. The latter is an i.i.d. random variable across
time and types, with a continuous and once-di⁄erentiable c.d.f., F(!), over a non-negative
support. It is assumed that !e;t+1 is unknown to both the entrepreneur and the lender prior
to the investment decision, with E(!) = 1 and V(!) = ￿2
!.
In the spirit of Townsend (1979), lenders pay a ￿xed monitoring cost to observe the borrow-
ers￿realized return, while borrowers observe it for free. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
monitoring cost is a proportion ￿ 2 [0;1] of the realized gross payo⁄ to the entrepreneur￿ s
capital, i.e., ￿!e;t+1rk
e;t+1qt~ ke;t+1.
The type-e entrepreneur chooses the value of her project￿ s capital, qt~ ke;t+1, and the asso-
ciated level of borrowing, be;t+1, prior to the realization of !e;t+1. The optimal contract
is characterized by a gross non-default loan rate, r
g
e;t+1; and a threshold value of the idio-
syncratic shock, ￿ !e;t+1, such that for values of !e;t+1 greater than or equal to ￿ !e;t+1, the
8entrepreneur repays the debt at rate r
g
e;t+1: Thus, ￿ !e;t+1 and r
g
e;t+1 are de￿ned by
￿ !e;t+1rk
e;t+1qt~ ke;t+1 = r
g
e;t+1be;t+1:
When !e;t+1 < ￿ !e;t+1, the entrepreneur declares bankruptcy and the lender pays the moni-
toring cost to audit the entrepreneur. To avoid any misreport temptation by the borrower,
it is assumed that once the lender is forced to audit, she keeps all of the borrower￿ s actual
returns.
The lender participates in the contract as long as an expected loan return equal to the
opportunity costs of its funds, represented by rt, the risk free rate is assured.
Let ￿ re;t = Etfrk
e;t+1=rtg be the expected discounted return on capital. The optimal lend-
ing contract consists of choosing ~ ke;t+1 and ￿ !e;t+1 to maximize the entrepreneurs expected
returns subject to the participation constraint of the lender.6 The ￿rst order conditions of
the problem imply that, at equilibrium, the discounted return on capital will be equal to
the marginal cost of external ￿nance, i.e.






with x0(￿) > 0, for nt+1 < qt~ kt+1: The intuition behind function x(￿) is quite simple: other
things being equal, the cost of external ￿nance should increase whenever the leverage ratio,
qt~ kt+1=nt+1, increases. This is because low levels of net worth (or collateral) increase the
probability of default on the loan. Consequently, the lender asks to be compensated with
a higher cost of borrowing in order to participate in the contract. This is the key feature
of the ￿nancial accelerator model, and allows us to treat the expected discounted return on
capital, ￿ re;t, as the external ￿nance premium.
6A detailed description of the ￿nancial contract is provided in a technical appendix, available upon request.
9Entrepreneurs in General Equilibrium Type-e entrepreneur, that owns the stock of
capital ~ ke;t, provides capital services ke;t to intermediate ￿rms, according to
ke;t = ue;t~ ke;t;
where ue;t > 0 is the individual rate of capital utilization. At the beginning of period t, after
observing all the shocks, entrepreneurs choose how intensively to use their capital. They
rent capital services to intermediate ￿rms, and once goods have been produced, they sell the
remaining un-depreciated stock of capital to the capital producer. Thus, the gross return




t)ue;tzt + (1 ￿ ￿(ue;t))qt
qt￿1
: (6)
where zt is the real payment for capital services taxed at a rate of ￿z
t per cent, and ￿(u) 2 [0;1]
is a convex depreciation function. Like Queijo von Heideken (2009), we consider a function
with ￿(0) = 0, limu!1 ￿(u) = 1, and with a steady-state value of ￿(1) = ￿. Entrepreneurs
choose the rate of capital utilization by maximizing Equation (6) with respect to ue;t. Notice
that, since zt and qt are aggregate prices, all entrepreneurs will choose exactly the same rate
of capital utilization, independently of their own capital holdings. This implies that rk
e;t = rk
t ,
ue;t = ut, ￿ re;t = ￿ rt 8 e; and
zt = ￿0(ut)qt:
Following Bernanke et al. (2000) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), entrepreneurs participate
in the general labor market by supplying one unit of labor every period, earning the nominal
wage We
t . Finally, each entrepreneur has a probability of exiting the economy of 1 ￿ ￿t.
This assumption captures the idea that entrepreneurs are not allowed to accumulate enough
10wealth to be fully self-￿nanced.7
The aggregate real net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t, nt+1, is given by
nt+1 = ￿tvt + (1 ￿ ￿w
t )we
t (7)
where (1 ￿ ￿w
t )we
t denotes the after-tax real wage earned by entrepreneurs. Gross revenues
from capital holdings from t ￿ 1 to t less borrowing repayments (i.e. the entrepreneurs￿
equity) are given by vt, where
vt = rk
t qt￿1~ kt (1 ￿ ￿G(￿ !t)) ￿ rt￿1(qt￿1~ kt ￿ nt) (8)
Entrepreneurs that fail in t, consume the residual net worth, ce
t = (1 ￿ ￿t)%vt; where the
complementary fraction (1 ￿ %) is transferred in lump-sum taxes to households.
Finally, we assume that the parameter ￿t follows
log(￿t) = ￿￿ log(￿t￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿￿)log(￿) + ￿￿;t;
where ￿￿ 2 (0;1), and ￿￿;t ￿ iid(0;￿￿). Christiano et al. (2009b) interpret variations
in ￿t as movements in the value of assets that are not obviously linked to movements in
fundamentals.8 Consequently, a drop in ￿t can be viewed as a decrease in the value of
entrepreneurs￿assets, which will have spillover e⁄ects on the credit market, the external
￿nance premium, and the rest of the economy.
7It is assumed, though, that the rate of birth of entrepreneurs equals the mortality rate, in order to keep
the number of entrepreneurs constant.
8Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) appeal to the former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan￿ s remark
about "irrational exuberance", concerning the stock market boom in the U.S in 1996.
112.3 Capital Producer
At the end of period t, after production has taken place, a competitive capital producer
buys the existing capital stock in order to combine it with a portion of ￿nal goods, denoted
as aggregate investment it, and produces the new stock of capital to be used in period
t + 1, ~ kt+1. Following Christiano et al. (2009b), we assume that the capital producer faces
investment adjustment costs denoted by ￿(it=it￿1), where ￿(￿) is an increasing and concave
function and ￿(0) = 0. Thus, ~ kt+1 evolves as follows








The new capital stock is sold to the entrepreneurs, yielding the pro￿t maximization problem








Qt~ kt+1 ￿ Qt(1 ￿ ￿(ut))~ kt ￿ Ptit
o
;subject to (9).
The presence of adjustment costs allows for a variable price of capital, which in turn con-
tributes to the volatility of the net worth. In equilibrium, the relative price of capital,





















2.4 Final Good Producers
The ￿nal good, yt, used for consumption and investment, is produced in a competitive
market by combining a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j 2 [0;1], via a typical
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The maximization of pro￿ts yields a sequence of input demand







where yj;t denotes the overall demand addressed to the producer of intermediate good j, ￿p
is the input demand elasticity, and Pj;t is the price of the intermediate good produced by
￿rm j.9
2.5 Intermediate Good Sector
Production Function Type-j intermediate ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated good by as-
sembling services of labor and capital, ‘j;t and kj;t, respectively. Capital services are rented
from the entrepreneur who owns the capital stock. Type-j ￿rm￿ s total labor input, ‘j;t is
composed of household labor, ‘h









Each monopolistic ￿rm chooses capital and labor services to minimize its real production
cost subject to the production technology (13), taking wt, we
t and zt as given.
Price Setting Prices are sticky in the sense introduced by Calvo (1983). That is, at each
period of time a ￿rm faces a constant probability, 1 ￿ ￿p, of being able to re-optimize its











13price. Even if the price cannot be re-optimized, it can be partially indexed to the most
recently available in￿ ation measure, ￿t￿1.
Let P?
j;t denote the nominal price chosen in time t and y?
j;t+k the demand for good j, k
quarters after the last price re-optimization. Therefore, ￿rm j selects P?
j;t so as to maximize
the present discounted sum of pro￿t streams, subject to its production technology and its





















j;t=P?, 1 + ￿t+k ￿ Pt+k=Pt, ￿p ￿ ￿p=(￿p ￿ 1) denotes the mark-up of the
monopolistic ￿rm, and ￿
p
t+k equals ￿T￿1
j=t (1+￿)1￿￿p(1+￿j)￿p when k > 0 and 1 otherwise,
where ￿p 2 (0;1) is the degree of partial indexation.
2.6 Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate follows a Taylor rule whenever such rule prescribes a non-negative
level for the central bank￿ s target interest rate. If this is not the case, then the central bank
simply ￿xes its target rate equal to zero. Following Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and
Bodenstein et al. (2009), we introduce the concept of a notional nominal interest rate, Rnot
t





















Here ￿R 2 (0;1) denotes the interest rate smoothing parameter, a￿ is the elasticity of Rnot
t
w.r.t. in￿ ation deviations, ay is the elasticity of Rnot
t w.r.t. the output gap, and y
f
t is the
output level that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities and ￿nancial frictions.
Notice that ￿ R denotes the steady-state level of the gross nominal interest rate, determined
14by (1+￿)￿￿1. The actual short-term gross nominal interest rate implemented by the central








The ￿scal authority purchases ￿nal goods (gt), raises distortionary labor income taxes (￿w
t ),
capital income taxes (￿z
t), lump-sum taxes (￿t), and issues debt (dt+1), consisting of one-












Like Gal￿ et al. (2007) and Bilbiie et al. (2009), we assume that the government budget
constraint is balanced in the steady-state, meaning that the level of public debt is zero in
the long run (d ￿ 0). In order to stabilize the public debt, we assume that the steady-state
percent deviations of lump-sum taxes (or transfers) follow the rule
^ ￿t = ~ ad ^ dt + ~ ag^ gt; (17)
where ^ dt ￿ dt=y denotes the debt-to-GDP ratio, and other hatted variables denote percent-
age deviations from the steady-state. Finally, ~ ad and ~ ag are positive constants. In addition,
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d ^ dt + ￿s
y^ yt pro-cyclical taxation
￿￿s^ ￿s
t￿1 + ￿￿s;t ￿scal stimulus
for s = fw;zg (18)
where s = fw;zg refers to the labor and capital income, respectively, ￿s
d and ￿s
y ￿ 0 are
positive constants, ￿￿s de￿nes a persistence parameter, and ￿￿s;t is tax rate shock. The ￿rst
speci￿cation simply dictates that the type-s tax rate is constant. The second speci￿cation
indicates that the type-s tax rate is pro-cyclical and it is adjusted to debt ratio deviations.
Finally, the third speci￿cation appeals to a ￿scal stimulus based on a type-s tax rate cut.
Last but not least, we assume that the steady-state percentage deviations of government
spending evolve exogenously according to a ARMA(p;q) process
A(L)^ gt = B(L)￿g;t
where ￿g;t is the government spending shock. The A(L) lag-polynomial allows us to model
^ gt as a strict monotonic process (as an AR(1)), or as a hump-shaped sequence (as an
AR(2)). The B(L) lag-polynomial allows implementation delays in government spending to
be modeled. We provide further details about the sequence of government spending in the
following sections.
2.8 Resource Constraint and Equilibrium
The production of the ￿nal good is allocated to investment, total private consumption by
households and entrepreneurs, public spending, and monitoring costs paid by lenders,
16yt = it + ct + ce
t + gt + ￿G(￿ !t)rk
t qt￿1~ kt:
In the symmetric equilibrium, all entrepreneurs, households, and ￿rms are identical and
make the same decisions. In addition, equilibrium on the labor market yields
R 1
0 ‘j;tdj = ‘h
t .
The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by an allocation fyt, ct, ce
t,it, ‘t, kt, ~ kt, ntg
and a sequence of price and co-state variables f￿t, rt, rk
t , qt, ￿w
t , zt, ￿tg that satis￿es the




The model￿ s parameters are calibrated to ￿t the quarterly frequency. Table 1 presents
the calibrated values for the parameters related to households, ￿rms, and the economic
authorities.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
The subjective discount factor, ￿, is set to 0:99, which implies an annual real interest rate
of 4 per cent. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply, $￿1
w ￿ V‘=(‘V‘‘); is set to unity. The
degree of habit on consumption, b, is set to 0:63, while the inverse of the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution, ￿, is set to 0:2. All these values are taken from Christiano et al.
(2009b).
Regarding production, the capital share in the intermediate sector, ￿, is set to 0:35; the
depreciation capital rate, ￿, equals 0:03, as in Christiano et al. (2009b); the investment
adjustment cost, { ￿ ￿00 (1), is calibrated to 5:86, following Smets and Wouters (2007);
the elasticity of the utilization rate of capital, #u ￿ u￿00(u)=￿0(u), is calibrated to 0:31￿1,
17similar to Queijo von Heideken (2008). When it comes to price setting, we assume that
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ￿p, is 11, which implies a price
mark-up of 10 per cent. Similarly, the elasticity of substitution between labor types, ￿p, is
set to 21, which translates into a wage mark-up of 5 per cent. The degrees of price and wage
rigidities, ￿p and ￿w; are set at 0:67 and 0:68, respectively, implying that the average time
between price or wage re-optimization is six months. Price and wage indexation parameters,
￿p and ￿w, are set to 0:75 and 0:70, respectively,. All these values have been estimated by
Christiano et al. (2009b). The steady-state in￿ ation, ￿, is zero.
Table 2 shows the calibrated values of the parameters related to the ￿nancial sector, which
are taken from Bernanke et al.￿ s (2000) results.
[ insert Table 2 here ]
The proportion of entrepreneurial wages in terms of income is set to 0:01, implying a value
of ￿ = 0:9846. The steady-state share of capital investment that is ￿nanced by the entre-
preneur￿ s net worth, x = ~ k=n, is calibrated to 2, meaning that the steady-state leverage
ratio amounts to 50 per cent. The steady-state external ￿nance premium, ￿ r = rk=r, is set to
1:020:25, corresponding to an annual risk spread of 200 basis points, equal to the sample aver-
age spread between the business prime lending rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate.
Finally, the annual business failure rate, F(￿ !), is set to 3 per cent. It is assumed that the
idiosyncratic productivity shock, !t, has a log-normal distribution with positive support,
and an unconditional expectation of 1. These moments help to determine the steady-state
survival probability of entrepreneurs, ￿, which is set to 0:98, the monitoring costs to realized
payo⁄s ratio, ￿, at 0:12, the steady-state variance of the entrepreneurs￿idiosyncratic shock,
￿!, which is 0:28, and the steady-state idiosyncratic threshold of 0:50.10
10In technical terms, ￿ !; ￿!, ￿ and ￿ are chosen so as to satisfy the following system of steady-state
18Table 3 shows the calibrated values of the parameters for monetary and ￿scal policies.
[ insert Table 3 here ]
The interest rate smoothing parameter, ￿R, is calibrated to 0:88; the elasticity of the notional
interest rate with respect to in￿ ation, a￿, is set to 1:85; and the elasticity of the interest
rate with respect to the output gap, ay, is set to 0:313=4. Once again, these values are
taken from the estimations of Christiano et al. (2009b). When it comes to the ￿scal policy,
the elasticity of lump-sum taxes with respect to debt and government spending are set
to 0:33 and 0:10 respectively. These values corresponds to Gal￿ et al.￿ s estimates (2007).
The steady-state labor and capital income tax rates are set at 0:28 and 0:36 respectively,
as suggested by Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010). They are assumed to be constant in the
benchmark calibration ( y =  d = 0). The steady-state share of government purchases in
total output is calibrated to 0:19, which corresponds to the last decade￿ s historical average.
3.2 Zero Lower Bound: Solution Strategy
The zero lower bound constraint, described in Equation (16), introduces an important non-
linearity into the system. Had this constraint not appeared, we could have proceeded to
analyze the dynamics of the economy using the linear rational expectations solution that
can be derived from the system described above. In fact, all the model equations can be
linearized except for the nominal interest rate, which imposes di⁄erent dynamics depending
on whether the zero lower bound constraint is binding or not.
We used the piecewise-linear approach described in Bodenstein et al. (2009) to solve for the
equations:
F(￿ !)= 0:03=4; x= 1 + ￿!(￿ !)[￿(￿ !) ￿ ￿G(￿ !)]=[[1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)][￿!(￿ !) ￿ ￿G!(￿ !)]];
(x ￿ 1)=x￿ r= ￿(￿ !) ￿ ￿G(￿ !); n= ￿[nr
kx[1 ￿ ￿G(￿ !)] ￿ rn(x ￿ 1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)w
e.
19model dynamics, which is numerically equivalent to the method employed by Eggertson and
Woodford (2003).11 To be speci￿c, we linearized all the model equations around the non-
stochastic steady-state, except for the monetary policy representation.12 We then assumed
that a set of exogenous shocks hit the economy and depressed the nominal interest rate so
that the zero lower bound was reached at Period 2, and remained in place for T periods.
The zero lower bound horizon T is determined by the time-T value of the notional interest
rate, which must satisfy the condition
Rnot
T < 1 ￿ Rnot
T+1: (19)
In terms of percentage deviation from the steady-state, this condition becomes ^ Rnot
T <
￿R ￿ ^ Rnot
T+1, where R = 1=￿, which is the steady-state level of the gross nominal interest
rate.13 We solved the log-linear rational expectations model by using the AIM algorithm (see
Anderson and Moore, 1985) and we ensured that Blanchard and Kahn￿ s (1980) conditions
was ful￿lled. The structural model was therefore transformed into a state space transition
system that could be used to compute the model￿ s dynamics. The piecewise-linear system
conforms to two di⁄erent dynamic structures. First, before Period 2, the nominal interest
rate follows a Taylor rule. From Period 2 to T, the zero lower bound constraint is binding
and the interest rate is equal to ￿R. The dynamics were derived using backward-induction
of the state-space system. This implies that the model￿ s impulse response functions (IRFs)
are deterministic, in the sense that agents make their decisions knowing that in period T +1
the interest rate will follow the Taylor rule path. Second, from period T + 1, the zero
11There are di⁄erent approaches to ￿xing the non-linearity problem resulting from the zero lower bound
constraint. For instance, the level of the nominal interest rate could be augmented by additive disturbances
that ensure that the zero lower bound constraint is hit for T periods (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000).
In this paper, we adopt the view that agents have perfect foresight on the duration of the liquidity trap.
This methodology has the advantage that agents can adjust their decisions to ￿scal expansions which are
announced several quarters in advance.
12See appendix B.
13According to the calibration of the preceding section, this equals 4 per cent in annual terms.
20lower bound constraint is not binding and the Taylor rule operates. The dynamics are then
derived by using the VAR representation of the model. Condition (19) is used to pick up
the value of T.14
4 E⁄ects of a Fiscal Stimulus during a Deep Recession
The purpose of this section is to highlight to what extent a ￿scal stimulus can help the
economy to recover from ￿nancial turmoil. First of all, we have to characterize both the
ingredients of the deep recession and the instruments of the ￿scal stimulus packages. The
economic downturn is driven by two simultaneous shocks: a temporal 10 per cent decrease
in the entrepreneurs￿survival probability (e.g. ￿t falls from 0:98 to 0:88), and a negative
preference shock, "t. We chose to combine these shocks for two reasons. First, the presence
of the two disturbances increases the probability that the interest rate hits its zero bound.15
Second, these two shocks generate both a reduction in consumption and investment that
characterizes a deep recession. Indeed, a negative preference shock re￿ ects an increase in
the household￿ s desire to save, which in turn increases the demand for bonds and puts
downward pressure on consumption, output, and the nominal interest rate.16 As for the
negative ￿nancial shock, it reduces the net worth, increasing in turn the external ￿nance
premium and depressing investment. The size of the two shocks was selected to ensure that
the nominal interest rate hit its zero-￿ oor at Quarter 2.
14The methodology is detailed in the appendix. Bodenstein et al. (2009) also present a detailed description
of this solution algorithm.
15Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), and Amano and Shukayev (2009),
among others, argue that in order to engage the zero lower bound constraint, single shocks would have to
be quite big with respect to what is usually estimated. Thus, the probability that the zero lower bound
constraint binds with a single shock is very low.
16Bodenstein et al. (2009), Christiano et al. (2009b), and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010) used shocks with
these characteristics to induce the zero lower bound in their analyses. Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010) assumed
that there was an interest rate spread shock between the risk-free rate and the rate perceived by households.
A shock of this kind has exactly the same e⁄ect as a preference shock, not only because both shocks appear
in the Euler equation in a similar way, but because both of them create an increase in the desire to save
inducing a drop in consumption.
21For our ￿scal stimulus packages, we consider two types of policy: a) the government decides
to increase its public expenditures and; b) it decides to decrease either the labor or capital
income tax rates.
4.1 Government Spending Expansion
In this subsection, we ￿rst assess the model dynamics resulting from an exogenous increase
in government purchases, and second, we quantitatively investigate the factors that modify
the e¢ ciency of this ￿scal policy on output.
4.1.1 Model dynamics
Figure 1 compares the IRFs of some macro-variables in the context of two scenarios. The
baseline scenario illustrates the severe recession without any ￿scal stimulus package. The
gov. spending scenario corresponds to the baseline case enriched by a positive government
spending shock. We assume that government spending follows an AR(1) process, with a
persistence coe¢ cient equal to ￿g = 0:945, as suggested by Christiano et al. (2009b). Since
the recession is particularly deep in the baseline scenario, for the sake of simplicity we
assume a substantial increase in government spending, rising from 19 per cent of GDP, its
steady-state value, to 23 per cent of GDP during the impact period.17
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
In the baseline scenario, the duration of the liquidity trap is 13 quarters. In our example,
the government spending expansion shortens the duration of the zero lower bound by one
quarter, and the ￿scal stimulus e⁄ectively reduces the drop in production. However, as the
17In this section, we assume that government spending increases at the same time as the recessionary
shocks hit the economy. In the next section, we relax this assumption to allow implementation delays in
￿scal policy.
22e⁄ects of the stimulus fade out, output eventually converges towards its baseline path in
the absence of the stimulus. The rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio is ￿nanced by an increase
in lump-sum taxes (or equivalently, a reduction in lump-sum transfers). The public de￿cit
increases at impact, due to both the rise in government spending and the decrease in income
tax revenues that follows the recession.
The most emblematic e⁄ect of government spending in the model is its impact on the
external ￿nance premium and the rest of the ￿nancial sector. An increase in government
spending expands aggregate demand, which translates into a lesser decrease of in￿ ation with
respect to the baseline scenario. As noted earlier, a lower drop in in￿ ation implies that the
entrepreneurs￿real debt increases by less, due to Fisher￿ s debt-de￿ ation channel. This has a
positive e⁄ect on the net worth of entrepreneurs, which reduces the moral hazard problem
in the ￿nancial sector. The lower decrease in the net worth induces a smaller increase in the
external ￿nance premium, which provides positive incentives to invest.18 Notice that the
real interest rate is actually lower under the gov. spending scenario. This is explained by
the fact that the nominal interest rate is constrained by its zero lower bound, and is thus
not responsive to the lower decrease in in￿ ation caused by the ￿scal stimulus. As a result,
investment is not crowded out but is actually stimulated by government spending, since the
external ￿nance premium is lower. In sum, investment is cheaper under the gov. spending
scenario than in the baseline one, and does not fall as much when the ￿scal stimulus is in
place.
When it comes to consumption, Figure 1 does not show a sizable impact of government
spending. On the one hand, the lesser decrease in output might also help consumption to
fall by less. On the other hand, the economy is subject to the Ricardian equivalence, and
thus an increase in government spending crowds out consumption. These two e⁄ects o⁄set
18A similar explanation can be found in FernÆndez-Villaverde (2010).
23each other in the ￿nal response of consumption, yielding the apparent lack of changes in
this variable.
To conclude, Fisher￿ s debt-de￿ ation channel is a main component in explaining the e⁄ects
of government spending on output and investment. In addition, the crowding-out e⁄ect on
investment following a positive government spending shock is lessened by the presence of the
zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. To disentangle the role of these
two factors in the e⁄ect of a government spending expansion on output, we resort to the
spending multiplier.
4.1.2 Counterfactual Exercises on the Spending Multiplier
We now determine how the spending multiplier is altered by the presence of credit market
imperfections and a zero nominal interest rate. The impact spending multiplier in period
t + k is determined by the marginal change in output in period t + k due to an increase
in government spending in period t, i.e.
dyt+k
dgt .19 The upper panel of Figure 3 displays the
determinants of the government spending multiplier. The benchmark spending multiplier is
the gov. spending scenario displayed in Figure 1, i.e. where the nominal interest rate binds
its zero lower bound and ￿nancial frictions are present.
[ insert Figure 3 here ]
19The impact spending multiplier can be computed by using the IRFs of the baseline and gov. spending
scenarios. Let ^ x
0
t denote the response of variable xt, in terms of percentage deviations from the steady-state,
given the baseline scenario. Similarly, let ^ x
fis
t denote the response of the same variable under the gov.
spending scenario. Since xt can be approximated by x(1 + ^ xt); where x is the steady state value of xt; then
the net e⁄ect of a ￿scal expansion on xt is given by x^ x
net
t , where ^ x
net
t ￿ ^ x
fis
t ￿ ^ x
0
t: The Quarter k impact












It is worth noticing that this ￿net ￿scal multiplier￿ corresponds exactly to the multiplier that would be
obtained in the absence of negative ￿nancial and preference shocks. Consequently, it can be compared to
the literature since it measures the e⁄ect of a spending expansion on output.
24The benchmark spending multiplier is slightly larger than that at impact, with a value of
1:09.20 Two years after the stimulus, the benchmark multiplier reaches 0:60. It appears
that output increases by slightly more than a one-by-one basis with respect to government
spending when both the zero lower bound and ￿nancial frictions are present. The intu-
ition behind this result is given by the positive net e⁄ect on investment provided by the
government spending expansion, as explained in the preceding section.
Role of the Zero Lower Bound One may ask if the benchmark spending multiplier
is greater than one due only to the presence of the zero lower bound. The line FA with
no-ZLB in Figure 3 tackles this point. In such a case, the ￿scal multiplier equals 0:87 at
impact and 0:33 after two years. The lower-than-one value of the multiplier can be explained
as follows. A ￿scal stimulus, like any other positive shock to aggregate demand, tends to
increase in￿ ation. If the nominal interest rate is allowed to be negative during the deep
economic recession, it would be relatively less negative after the stimulus. Thus, the real
interest would increase more sharply than when the nominal rate is not constrained by its
zero-￿ oor. Thus, investment would become relatively more expensive, following the classic
crowding-out e⁄ect. This example illustrates the claim that the ￿scal multiplier tends to be
larger when the zero lower bound constraint is binding (Christiano et al., 2009a).
Role of Financial Frictions What is the impact of credit market imperfections on the
e¢ ciency of government spending? Figure 3 shows that the government spending multiplier
is reduced in comparison with the benchmark con￿guration when we consider an economy
that does not feature ￿nancial imperfections (shown by the line No-FA with ZLB). Indeed,
it equals 1:01 at impact and reaches 0:43 after two years. This result can be explained by the
20In a model without ￿nancial frictions and the zero lower bound constraint, this value reaches 0:85.
Zubairy (2009) estimates a value greater than one, but her model embeds deep habit formation in public
and private consumption. Our result is consistent with Cogan et al. (2010).
25fact that in the no-￿nancial accelerator model, entrepreneur decisions are not conditional on
the external ￿nancial premium. In this case, government spending has no relevant impact
on the net worth or the risk premium. The Fisher debt-de￿ ation channel is shut down,
and thus the potency of government spending to reduce the risk premium is nil, which also
foreclosures the additional incentives for investment coming from this mechanism. This
result is consistent with Cogan et al. (2010).
Extended zero-rate duration We also tackle the possibility that the monetary and ￿scal
authorities undertake a policy mix corresponding to a zero-interest-rate commitment and
a ￿scal expansionary policy. To do so, we assume that the economic authorities implement
an increase in government purchases along with the announcement of keeping the future
nominal interest rate at zero for a longer period than prescribed by the monetary policy
rule (16).21 We assume that the central bank commits to keeping the nominal interest rate
at zero for 20 periods, that is 6 periods more than the recommendation of the Taylor rule.
Figure 3 shows that the net e⁄ect of government spending under this policy mix is greater,
as shown by the spending multiplier FA with Zero-rate commitment.22 In particular, the
multiplier equals 1:18 at impact and 0:75 after two years, with a peak value of 1:23 in
the second quarter. Since agents expect a low interest rate for a longer period of time, they
respond to the adverse economic conditions by smoothing their consumption and investment.
This yields an even lower drop in in￿ ation than in the gov. spending scenario of Figure 1,
which in turn produces a lower increase in the real interest rate. On the one hand, a smaller
21Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) discuss the implications for the economic dynamics of managing public
expectations about the future path of the interest rate. The argument, is that economic agents make their
decisions taking into account their expectations about the future policy that the central bank is likely to
implement. The bottom line of their discussion is that, according to their optimal path for monetary policy,
the central bank should announce and maintain the nominal interest rate at very low levels for longer than
would normally be prescribed by a strict in￿ ation targeting rule. This is explained by the fact that, when
agents expect a period of abundant liquidity, accompanied by a rise in in￿ ation expectations, they will start
to increase consumption and investment from today.
22The net e⁄ect of ￿scal policy is computed by substracting the pure e⁄ects of the zero-rate commitment
policy from the ￿nal e⁄ects on economic activity that result from the policy mix.
26increase in the real interest rate implies that service charges on the debt that entrepreneurs
have to pay are lower. On the other hand, a smaller decrease in in￿ ation rises by less the
real debt of entrepreneurs through the debt-de￿ ation channel. These two e⁄ects lessen the
crowding-out e⁄ect on investment and make the recession milder. Therefore, this result tells
us that a policy mix, characterized by a zero interest rate commitment and an increase in
government spending, is the most e⁄ective measure to increase output.
4.2 Distortionary Tax Cut
We now turn to investigating the impact of a temporal reduction in the labor and capital
income tax rates. We assume in this case that the percentage deviation of the income tax
rate, ^ ￿s
t, for s = fw;zg, follows an AR(1) process, with a persistence parameter ￿￿ equal to
0:80. We assume that the labor income tax rate temporarily shifts from 0:28, its steady-state
value, to 0:25, while the capital income tax rate shifts from 0:36 to 0:31. These variations
correspond to a decrease of 15% in both tax rates.
4.2.1 Model dynamics
Figure 2 compares the IRFs of an economy that su⁄ers from a deep recession with and
without an income tax cut policy. Notice that lowering income tax rates does not a⁄ect
the zero lower bound duration, which still binds for 13 quarters. Income tax policy does,
however, have a di⁄erent e⁄ect on in￿ ation and output, as can be seen by comparing the
labor tax and capital tax scenarios in Figure 2.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
In particular, we ￿nd that a reduction in the capital income tax rate increases the returns to
capital which in turn increases the net worth. Investment is thus stimulated, which entails a
27positive impact on in￿ ation. The damped decrease in in￿ ation stimulates the economy even
further through the debt-de￿ ation channel. Consequently, the net increase in investment
implies that the recession is milder.
In contrast, the e⁄ects on in￿ ation and output of a labor income tax cut are reversed. A
labor income tax cut increases the returns on labor, leading households to increase their
labor supply. In turn, this implies a reduction in nominal wages. This diminishes the labor
costs that ￿rms are facing, which will tend to decrease in￿ ation even further than under
the baseline scenario. This makes the cost of borrowing higher, through the debt-de￿ ation
channel. Therefore, investment decreases by more when the government undertakes a labor
income tax cut policy, yielding a worse recession.
Finally, notice that the debt ratio rises by more when a labor income tax cut is performed.
This is due to the high share of labor tax revenues on the government budget constraint.
4.2.2 Counterfactual Exercises on the Tax Multipliers
We now disentangle the role of ￿nancial frictions and the zero lower bound on the economic
e¢ ciency of the previously proposed tax cut policies. To do so, we employ the Quarter k
impact total tax revenue multiplier, which is determined by the marginal change in output








dTt .23 This ￿scal multiplier measure, used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and Zubairy (2009), is useful for making comparable statements about the e⁄ect on output
of di⁄erent tax policies. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the total tax revenue
multiplier that is driven by a shock in the labor income tax rate as the labor tax multiplier.
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28A similar logic applies to our capital tax multiplier measure. The upper-right and bottom
panels of Figure 3 display the labor and capital tax multipliers for di⁄erent con￿gurations.
As in the previous section, the benchmark ￿scal multipliers correspond to the labor tax and
capital tax scenarios displayed in Figure 2, i.e. when the zero lower bound and ￿nancial
frictions are present.
Interestingly, the benchmark labor tax multiplier is negative at impact, and becomes positive
at Quarter 6, with a peak of 0:12 in Quarter 12. In contrast, the benchmark capital tax
multiplier is positive at impact and it reaches a peak of 0:84 in Quarter 5. It is worth
noting, however, that the value of these tax multipliers are small in comparison with the
benchmark spending multiplier. This can be explained by the fact that, even if they provide
more incentives to consume and invest, these policies do not have the straightforward impact
of an aggregated demand shock that directly fuels the economy.
Role of the Zero Lower Bound It appears that the labor tax multiplier is higher
than the benchmark when the zero lower bound constraint is not hit. Indeed, it becomes
positive, equaling 0:07 at impact, with a peak at 0:26 after two years. As suggested earlier, a
reduction in the labor tax rate drives down in￿ ation through the reduction in nominal wages.
Consequently, all other things being equal, the real interest rate should increase. However,
by allowing the nominal interest rate to follow the Taylor rule, and thus become negative,
the real interest rate would be actually lower than in the labor tax scenario of Figure 2, thus
stimulating the economy. The zero lower bound constraint prevents this happening, and this
is why a labor income tax cut policy is not e⁄ective during a liquidity trap.
When it comes to the capital tax multiplier, the previous mechanism is reversed, since this
￿scal policy has a positive net e⁄ect on in￿ ation. Therefore, as for a government spending
expansion, the absence of the zero lower bound constraint decreases the size of the multiplier,
meaning that the real interest rate is higher than in the capital tax scenario of Figure 2.
29The capital tax multiplier is thus lower than the benchmark, equaling just 0:08 at impact
and peaking at 0:41 in Quarter 12.
Role of Financial Frictions Interestingly, when ￿nancial frictions are omitted, the labor
tax multiplier is bigger than the benchmark. Again, this can be explained by the e⁄ect of a
labor income tax cut on in￿ ation. When ￿nancial frictions are present, the stronger decrease
in in￿ ation due to this policy is followed by a "negative" debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect that increases
the value of debt for entrepreneurs, reducing the value of collateral and increasing the
external ￿nance premium. In the absence of ￿nancial frictions, this recessionary e⁄ect on
investment and output is shut down.
On the other hand, the capital income tax multiplier is smaller than the benchmark in
the absence of ￿nancial frictions. This is due to the fact that, without ￿nancial frictions,
the role of collateral is irrelevant for the cost of credit, and does not alter the dynamics of
investment.
Extended zero-rate duration We now turn to assessing how a zero-nominal-interest-
rate commitment modi￿es the value of the ￿scal multipliers.24 The change in the size of the
capital tax multiplier during the policy mix are negligible in comparison to the benchmark
case. However, the labor tax multiplier is, as expected, lower than the benchmark when
the period of the liquidity trap is extended. In this case, consumers and investors expect
to see high real interest rates for a longer period of time, due to the extended zero-rate
commitment and the stronger decrease in in￿ ation put in place by the labor tax policy.
Thus, investment is discouraged even further than in the benchmark case.
24We follow a similar strategy to that in Section 4.1.2 to compute the net e⁄ect of ￿scal policy.
305 Government Spending Multiplier and Fiscal Strategies
The goal of this section is to further investigate how credit market imperfections a⁄ect the
size of the government spending multiplier, when the government adopts di⁄erent ￿scal
strategies. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First, we look at the size of the spending
multiplier when distortionary taxes respond to debt and output. Second, we allow for delays
in the implementation of the spending expansion.
5.1 The Spending Multiplier with Di⁄erent Taxation Policies
Financing a large increase in government spending can require the raising of distortionary
taxes that are known to reduce the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policy, since the incentives for
consumption and investment may be weakened.
In this section, we re-compute the government spending multiplier for two di⁄erent dis-
tortionary tax rules. The results are displayed in Figure 4, in which the upper-left panel
corresponds to a model in which both ￿nancial frictions and the zero lower bound are present;
the upper-right panel excludes ￿nancial frictions but maintains the zero lower bound con-
straint; and, the bottom panel removes the zero lower bound while it maintains ￿nancial
frictions. The benchmark spending multiplier corresponds to the case where both the labor
and capital income tax rates are constant, implying that ￿w
t = 0:28 and ￿z
t = 0:36 at each
date. For the time-varying labor tax spending multiplier we assume that the capital income
tax rate is constant, while the labor income tax rate follows the rule de￿ned in Equation
(18), in which the tax rate responds to the level of debt and is pro-cyclical. Finally, for
the time-varying capital tax spending multiplier, we assume that the labor income tax rate
is constant, while the capital income tax rate follows Rule (18). Using Zubairy￿ s (2009)
estimates, we assume that ￿w
y = 0:11 and ￿w
d = 0:02, while ￿z
y = 0:13 and ￿z
d = 0:01.
31[ insert Figure 4 here ]
We show that the value of the government spending multiplier is smaller when the govern-
ment raises capital income taxes to ￿nance its debt, instead of keeping them constant. For
instance, the spending multiplier in the baseline is 1:05, while it is 0:92 when ￿z
t follows Rule
(18). This can easily be explained. Capital income taxes increase due to the rise in output
(driven by the government spending stimulus) and the rise in debt. This reduces the rental
rate of capital and therefore magni￿es the crowding-out e⁄ect in investment generated by
the positive government spending shocks. Consequently, investment is reduced and output
increases by less after the rise in government purchase. Another interesting result emerges
from Figure 4. The size of the spending multiplier is larger when the labor income taxes fol-
lows Rule (18). It reaches 1:17 at impact and peaks at 1:20 in Quarter 2. This indicates that
a government spending expansion can be more e¢ cient when it is ￿nanced by labor income
taxes. In our case, the labor income tax strongly increases, led by the expansionary e⁄ect
of the government spending expansion. As noted before, the rise in the labor income taxes
drives in￿ ation up, due to the increase in nominal wages. This increase in in￿ ation reduces
the real interest rate more and makes the debt de￿ ation channel more active. These two
standard e⁄ects stimulate investment and improve the e¢ ciency of the government spend-
ing policy. This result contrasts with the ￿nding of Erceg and LindØ (2010). Unlike these
authors, we assume that labor tax responds both to debt and to output. Therefore, the
increase in labor income taxes is su¢ ciently strong to raise in￿ ation, stimulating investment
through the zero lower bound and the debt-de￿ ation channel.25
This interpretation is con￿rmed by the middle and right panels of Figure 4. For a time-
25We carried out the same exercise by assuming ￿y = 0 and ￿y = 0:02, consistent with the Erceg and
LindØ (2010) rule. We obtained results similar to theirs. Indeed, since labor income taxes only respond to
debt, they increased slightly. Therefore, the negative wealth e⁄ect dominated the increase in nominal wages.
This implies that in￿ ation is slightly smaller with constant wage taxation.
32varying labor income tax, we show that the spending multiplier is close to the baseline
case when the model does not feature ￿nancial frictions and it becomes smaller when the
nominal interest rate can reach negative values. This suggests that the rise in in￿ ation
driven by both the government spending expansion and the rise in labor income tax helps
to rescue the economy through the debt-de￿ ation channel and the zero lower bound. When
it comes to the capital income tax, the role of these two factors is di⁄erent. After a positive
government spending shock, in￿ ation increases by less when capital income taxes increase.
In the absence of ￿nancial frictions and a zero lower bound, this smaller increase in in￿ ation
is less painful, implying that the spending ￿scal multipliers are close to the baseline case.
To conclude, we have shown in this section that time-varying labor income taxes can improve
the e¢ ciency of the government spending shock, when they are pro-cyclical and the zero
lower bound constraint is active. On the contrary, time-varying capital income taxes always
reduce the value of the spending multiplier, due to their negative impact on in￿ ation.
5.2 Delays in the Implementation of Government Spending
The time scale over in which a ￿scal stimulus is implemented is a major concern when
studying the ￿nal e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on output. Ramey (2010) shows that government
spending expansions are usually anticipated, at least several months in advance. The con-
sensus among economists is that the longer it takes to increase government spending, the
less e⁄ective it will be in raising output. The intuition behind this statement is quite simple.
If the strong pulse of the stimulus comes at a time when the economy has already started
to recover, the increase in government spending may raise the short and long run interest
rates, eventually crowding-out investment.26 This subsection aims at reviewing the e⁄ects
of lagged implementation in government spending with and without ￿nancial frictions, while
26For instance, Erceg and LindØ (2010) show, using a model featuring no ￿nancial frictions and a liquidity
trap, that the ￿scal multiplier can even be negative when the government spending expansion is undertaken
too late.
33the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is active.
For this purpose, we assume that government spending, as a percentage deviation from its
steady state-value, follows an ARMA(2;q) process
^ gt = ￿g1^ gt￿1 + ￿g2^ gt￿2 + b0￿g;t + b1￿g;t￿1 + ::: + bq￿g;t￿q:
The two autoregressive terms allow ^ gt to display a (concave) hump-shaped pattern, which
re￿ ects the fact that any realistic ￿scal stimulus would need some time to reach its peak.
The moving average terms allow us to determine in which period the increase in government
spending occurs.27 For instance, if we assume that b4 > 0 while all other bq0 are equal to zero,
this means that government spending will increase a year after its o¢ cial announcement.
This in turn implies that, from period t = 0, all agents in the economy make their decisions
knowing that in period t = 4 increases in government purchases will take place.28
Taking into account implementation lags in government spending deter us from using the
impact ￿scal multiplier introduced in Section 4.1.2, since in most cases the percentage
deviation of government spending will be zero at the impact period. Thus, we follow Zubairy
(2009) and Uhlig (2010) by introducing an alternative measure of e¢ ciency of government






















where PV Mk measures the total discounted net e⁄ect of government spending on output
k-periods ahead in time, from the perspective of an agent in period t. We introduce the
27Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2008) adopt a similar speci￿cation to model anticipated shock. They show
that this type of shocks explains a signi￿cant part of the business cycle.
28Since the model solution method implies a deterministic pattern for the economic dynamics, an
ARMA(p;q) process for government spending allows us to introduce future shocks that are known by every-
body from the initial period.
34same negative net worth and preference shocks described in Section 4 in order to generate
a deep recession in two versions of the model: one in which ￿nancial frictions are present,
and another in which they are absent. The persistence parameters of government spending
are set to ￿g1 = 1:4 and ￿g2 = ￿0:45.
Figure 5 displays the pattern of various government spending shocks that we assume in the
analysis.
[ insert Figure 5 here ]
All of these processes are rescaled so that the total amount of public expenditure for every
lagged structure is equal in present value terms. In order to keep the duration of the zero
lower bound constraint constant across all implementation delays, we consider a modest
increase in government spending. This assumption allow us to focus only on the e⁄ect of
the delays themselves.
We ￿rst focus on the long run e⁄ects of a government spending expansion on output with
di⁄erent delays on its implementation. Table 4 shows the value of PV Mk for k = 50, for
di⁄erent lag structures and model environments.
[ insert Table 4 here ]
In accord with the results reported in Section 4.1.2, a government spending expansion always
has a greater impact on output when ￿nancial frictions are present. Following the same
logic as in the preceding sections, this is a signal that credit market imperfections along
with the debt-de￿ ation channel help to minimize the crowding-out e⁄ect of investment. A
second result is that, at least in the long run, implementation delays decrease the size of the
government spending multiplier. This might seen to con￿rm the standard view regarding
the importance of implementing a government spending expansion as quickly as possible. In
35the short run, however, the presence of ￿nancial frictions brings a completely new message
about how this implementation should take place.
Figure 6 displays the value of PV Mk for di⁄erent short run horizons for the two versions of
the model.
[ insert Figure 6 here ]
First, consider the model without ￿nancial frictions. In that case, Figure 6 again shows that
implementation delays decrease the value of the multiplier, with values that may even be
negative when the government spending expansion in undertaken too late (close to the end
of the liquidity trap). This result is in line with the results of Erceg and LindØ (2010).
Interestingly, in the model with ￿nancial frictions this result is reversed. Short delays in
the implementation of government spending increase the value of the multiplier in the very
short run. This apparently counter-intuitive result can be explained as follows. When
government spending is expected to increase in, say, one year from now, agents adjust their
in￿ ation expectations upwards from the present period. This activates the debt-de￿ ation
channel by increasing the net worth and decreasing the risk premium. Thus, investment
and output start increasing from today, even before the ￿scal stimulus physically takes
place, which eventually entails a positive e⁄ect on in￿ ation. In a year from now, when
government spending actually rises, output has already accumulated some gains from the
expected stimulus, which makes the size of the present value multiplier much greater than
one. Eventually, the value of the multiplier decreases in order to establish the ordering found
in the long run, as summarized by Table 4. It is worth noticing, however, that even if short
delays may imply big multipliers in the short run, long delays yield small multipliers. Thus,
the presence of ￿nancial frictions tells us that, in addition to ensuring short delays when
increasing public expenditures, the government should also announce with precision when,
and by how much, it will increase expenditure. By doing so, the ￿scal authority can exploit
36an expectations e⁄ect that might provide incentives to the economy using the debt-de￿ ation
channel.
6 ARRA Implementation
In this section, we simulate the path of the ARRA in order to assess the importance of the
output gains derived from the presence of ￿nancial frictions and the alternative duration
periods of the liquidity trap. We refer to Cogan et al.￿ s (2010) ARRA approximations
regarding the path of government spending from 2009 to 2013. As in the preceding sections,
we assume that agents know in advance the sequence of government spending. In addition,
we simulate the ARRA stimulus package for two di⁄erent durations of the liquidity trap.
In the ￿rst case, we assume that the nominal interest rate remains at its zero-￿ oor from
2009Q1 to 2010Q2, that is 6 quarters in total. In the second case, we assume that the
liquidity trap starts in 2009Q1 and remains in place until 2011Q4, or 12 quarters in total.
Figure 7 displays the path of government spending according to Cogan et al. (2010), along
with its impact on output, consumption, and investment, for the two assumed paths of
the liquidity trap. In this exercise, we consider again two versions of the model: one with
￿nancial frictions (FA), and another without (NFA).
[ insert Figure 7 here ]
According to the models, the maximum impact of the ARRA ￿scal stimulus on output
occurs during 2010. To be precise, the rise in GDP reaches 0:61% in the FA model when
the liquidity trap lasts for 6 quarters, and 0:87% when it lasts for 12 quarters. The NFA
model, in which ￿nancial frictions are omitted, shows a smaller e⁄ect of the ￿scal stimulus
on output. This is explained by the di⁄erent predictions that the two models make for the
37impact on investment, as can be seen in the middle panels of Figure 7. As expected, the
model with ￿nancial frictions predicts a higher impact on investment. The reasons behind
this e⁄ect have been explored extensively in the preceding sections, in which the impact of
the stimulus on in￿ ation and the debt-de￿ ation channel play a crucial role. In the case of
consumption, the two models have predicted quite similar results.
The FA model also predicts that the accumulated gains in output that can be attributed to
the presence of ￿nancial frictions are of the order of 1:26% of GDP, in present value terms,
from 2009 to 2013 when the liquidity trap lasts for 6 quarters, and of 2:46% when it lasts
for 12 quarters. Taken together, these results con￿rm the importance that ￿nancial frictions
and the debt-de￿ ation channel have on the e¢ ciency of ￿scal policy.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how ￿scal stimulus packages can help an economy to recovery, when
a deep recession has make the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binding. The
recession is driven by a negative ￿nancial shock, characterized by a negative net worth shock,
and a negative preference shock. The ￿scal stimulus package that we consider consists of
either an increase in government spending, or a cut in distortionary labor and capital income
taxes.
In the ￿rst step, we analyzed whether credit market imperfections and the zero nominal
interest rate a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of these policies. We show that ￿nancial frictions combined
with the debt-de￿ ation channel play a major role in the ￿scal policy￿ s e¢ ciency. For in-
stance, a government spending expansion or a capital income tax cut dampen the reduction
in in￿ ation, decreasing the nominal debt of entrepreneurs and stimulating investment. In
contrast, a labor income tax cut makes the drop in in￿ ation stronger, raising the nominal
debt of entrepreneurs and worsening the recession.
38In the second step, we examine di⁄erent ￿scal policy strategies to assess the importance
of ￿nancial frictions on the government spending multiplier. We show that the spending
multiplier can be higher when it is ￿nanced by labor income taxes. Indeed, the rise in labor
income taxes dampens the drop in in￿ ation, stimulating investment and output. Secondly,
we show that when ￿nancial frictions are present, implementing a government spending
expansion with a lag can have positive e⁄ects on the short run ￿scal multiplier. This can be
explained by expectations of higher in￿ ation that stimulate investment through the debt-
de￿ ation channel.
Finally, we simulated the path of ARRA in our model. We show that the rise in GDP due
to the ARRA package is between 1:26% in the absence of ￿nancial frictions and 2:46% in
their presence.
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43Appendix A: log-linearized model
Household
(1 ￿ ￿b)￿^ ￿t = ￿bEtf^ ct+1g ￿ (1 + ￿b2)^ ct + b^ ct￿1 + ￿^ "t ￿ ￿b￿Etf^ "t+1g; (20)
where ￿￿1 = ￿Uccc=Uc.
^ ￿t ￿ ^ Rt = Et
n
^ ￿t+1 ￿ ^ ￿t+1
o
and ^ rt = ^ Rt ￿ Etf^ ￿t+1g: (21)
^ ￿w
t ￿ ￿w^ ￿t￿1 =




t ￿ ^ ￿t ￿ ^ wt + ^ ￿t
i
+ ￿Etf^ ￿w
t+1 ￿ ￿w^ ￿tg; (22)
where $w = ‘hV‘‘=V‘.
^ ￿w
t = ^ wt ￿ ^ wt￿1 + ^ ￿t: (23)
Intermediate Good Sector
^ yt = (1 ￿ ￿)^ ‘t + ￿^ kt and ^ ‘t = ￿^ ‘h
t : (24)
^ wt = ^ st + ^ yt ￿ ^ ‘h
t ; ^ we
t = ^ st + ^ yt, and ^ zt = ^ st + ^ yt ￿ ^ kt (25)
^ ￿t ￿ ￿p^ ￿t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ ￿￿p)
￿p
^ st + ￿Et
￿




^ xt = ^ qt￿1 + b ~ kt ￿ ^ nt; and b ￿ rt = ^ rk
t ￿ ^ rt￿1 (27)
44Etfb ￿ rt+1g = Etf^ ￿t+1g[1 ￿ ￿ r[￿(￿ !) ￿ ￿G(￿ !)]]; (28)





￿!!(￿ !) ￿ ￿G!!(￿ !)
￿!(￿ !) ￿ ￿G!(￿ !)
￿
; (29)
^ xt+1 = Etfb ￿ rt+1g[x ￿ 1] + Etfb ￿ !t+1g￿ !￿ rx[￿!(￿ !) ￿ ￿G!(￿ !)]: (30)
where












t+x1g = Etf^ zt+1 ￿ ^ ￿tg
z(1 ￿ ￿)
rk + Etf^ qt+1g
(1 ￿ ￿)
rk ￿ ^ qt: (31)
^ nt+1
1
xrk = (^ ￿t + ^ vt)￿[1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)] + ( ^ we




￿ ￿[1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)]
￿
; (32)
^ vt[1￿￿(￿ !)] = ^ rk






































= ^ {t[1 + ￿] ￿^ {t￿1 ￿ ￿Etf^ {t+1g; (36)
where { = ￿00 (1).
45^ kt = ^ ut + b ~ kt and ^ zt = #u^ ut + ^ qt; where #u = u￿00(u)=￿0(u): (37)
Resource Constraint
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^ Rt = ￿R ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)a￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿R)ay^ yt (39)
Fiscal Policy
￿ ^ dt+1 = ^ dt + ￿g^ gt ￿ ￿￿^ ￿t ￿ ￿(^ ￿t ￿ ^ yt); (40)
^ ￿t = ad ^ dt + ag^ gt; (41)
￿^ ￿t = ￿d ^ dt + ￿y^ yt; (42)
\ deficitt = ￿g^ gt ￿ ￿￿^ ￿t ￿ ￿(^ ￿t ￿ ^ yt): (43)
46Appendix B: Solving the model with a ZLB constraint
The methodology used in this paper to solve the model in the presence of a zero lower bound
constraint follows Bodenstein et al. (2009). All the equations of the model are loglinearized,
except for the ZLB constraint given by Equation (16).
The loglinearized model was solved by using the AIM algorithm (see Anderson and Moore,
1985). The equilibrium conditions are written in the matrix form
H￿1yt￿1 + H0yt + Et fH1yt+1g + G0"t = 0; (44)
where yt is a vector (n ￿ 1) of variables with n being the number of variables (including
shocks), Hi refers to structural coe¢ cient matrices (n￿n), "t is a vector (k￿1) of innovations
with k as the number of innovation and G0 is a matrix (n ￿ k).
To impose the zero lower bound constraint on this model, we proceeded in three steps. In
System (44), let us assume that the line associated with Rt is the ￿rst line while Rnot
t is
associated to the second line. We assume that the zero lower bound constraint is hit from
period Tlow to Tup.
Let consider the solution of Equation (44) for t ￿ Tup + 1,
yt = Fyt￿1 + C"t; (45)
Then, let recursively solve the system for Tlow < t ￿ Tup. The system (44) is re-written as
~ H0yt = ￿H￿1yt￿1 ￿ Et fH1yt+1g ￿ G0"t ￿ g; (46)
where ~ H0 is an (n￿n) matrix, and g is an (n￿1) vector. The di⁄erence between ~ H0 and H0
is that we set ~ H0(2;2) = 0, implying that Rt = Rnot. In addition, we impose g(2;1) = R,
47implying that the notional interest rate is set to its steady state value.
If t = Tup, then, plugging Equation (45) into Equation (46) yields
~ H0yTup = ￿H￿1yTup￿1 ￿ H1FyTup ￿ g;
, yTup = ￿1yTup￿1 + ~ g1; (47)
where ￿1 ￿ ￿(~ H0 + H1F)H￿1 and ~ g1 = ￿(~ H0 + H1F)g.
Then we can solve the model from Tup￿1 to Tlow, by backward induction. For t = Tup￿1,
we can write Equation (46) as
yTup￿1 = ￿~ H￿1
0 H￿1yTup￿2 ￿ ~ H￿1
0 H1yTup ￿ ~ H￿1
0 g; (48)
and using Equation (47) yields
yTup￿1 = ￿2yTup￿2 + ~ g2: (49)
where ￿2 ￿ ￿
h




0 H￿1 and ~ g2 ￿ ￿
h
In + ~ H￿1
0 H1￿1
ih




We generalize the expressions so that ￿i ￿ ￿
h




0 H￿1 and ~ gi ￿
￿
h
In + ~ H￿1
0 H1￿i￿1
ih




Consequently, for 2 ￿ i ￿ Tup￿Tlow, computing the dynamics of yT￿i amounts to compute
￿t and ~ gt so that
yTup￿i = ￿i+1yTup￿i￿1 + ~ gi+1: (50)
The next step is to compute the dynamics for 0 ￿ t < Tlow. For Tup ￿ Tlow + 1 ￿ i < Tup,
the dynamics are expressed as previously, except that ~ H￿1
0 is replaced by H￿1
0 .
48Finally, for i = Tup, the impact response of the variables is given by
y0 = ~ ￿Tup+1"0 + ~ gTup+1: (51)







The choice of T, for T = fTlow;Tupg is determined by computing Rnot
T and Rnot
T+1 and
ensuring that ^ Rnot
T < ￿R ￿ ^ Rnot
T+1.
49Table 1. Calibrated Parameters
Preferences and Technology Value
￿ Discount factor 0:99
b Degree of habit on consumption 0:63
￿ Inv. of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0:20
!w Elasticity of labor disutility 1:00
￿ Elasticity of value added wrt capital 0:35
￿ Capital depreciation rate 0:03
{ Investment adjustment cost 5:86
#u Utilization rate of capital parameter 1=0:31
Nominal Rigidities
￿p Elasticity of substitution of goods 11:00
￿p Degree of price stickiness 0:67
￿p Degree of price indexation 0:75
￿w Elasticity of substitution of labor 21:00
￿w Degree of wage stickiness 0:69
￿w Degree of wage indexation 0:70
50Table 2. Calibrated Parameters
Financial Accelerator Mechanism Value
￿ Proportion of household labor in aggr. labor 0:9846
x Steady-state ratio of capital to net worth 2:00
￿ r Steady-state risk spread 1:020:25
￿ Survival rate of entrepreneurs 0:9785
￿ ! Threshold value of idiosyncratic shock 0:4982
￿! Standard error of idiosyncratic shock 0:2764
(1 ￿ %) Tranfers from failed entrepreneur to households 0:99
￿ Monitoring cost 0:1175
Table 3. Calibrated Parameters
Monetary Policy Value
￿R Interest rate smoothing 0:88
a￿ Elasticity of the interest rate wrt in￿ ation 1:85
ay Elasticity of the interest rate wrt output gap 0:08
Fiscal Policy Value
g=y Share of government expenditure in output 0:19
￿b Elasticities of lump-sum taxes wrt debt 0:33
￿g Elasticities of lump-sum taxes wrt government spending 0:10
 y Elasticities of distortionay taxes wrt output [0;0:05]
 d Elasticities of distortionay taxes wrt debt [0;0:05]
￿ Income tax rate [0;0:30]
Table 4. Value of PV Mk, with k = 50
No lag 2 lags 4 lags 6 lags 8 lags 10 lags 12 lags
With ￿nancial frictions 1.04 0.99 0.93 0.83 0.71 0.56 0.42
Without ￿nancial frictions 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.36















































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: IRFs multiplied by 100 to a negative ￿nancial shock (decrease in ￿t) and a negative preference
shock (decrease in "t). The solid lines correspond to the baseline model￿ s dynamics under the deep recession
and without ￿scal expansion. The dashed lines represent the IRF to an increase in government spending
under the deep recession.















































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: IRFs multiplied by 100 to a negative ￿nancial shock (decrease in ￿t) and a negative preference
shock (decrease in "t). The solid lines correspond to the baseline model￿ s dynamics under the deep recession
without ￿scal expansion. The dotted lines represent the IRFs to a deep recession and a labor income tax
cut. The dashed lines represent the IRFs to a deep recession and a capital income tax cut.




























































































Figure 3: Fiscal multiplier for various model speci￿cations. The solid line shows the benchmark scenario.
The starred line corresponds to a model without ZLB constraint. The line with triangles corresponds to a
model without ￿nancial frictions. The line with circles corresponds to the benchmark case with a zero interest
rate period of 20 quarters.

































































































Figure 4: Gov. spending multiplier for various taxation policies. The solid line represents the benchmark
case. The starred line corresponds to a model with labor income taxes that vary with output and debt.
The line with triangles corresponds to a model with capital income taxes that vary with output and debt.
The left upper panel shows to the benchmark model with ￿nancial frictions and ZLB, while the right upper
panel illustrates a model without ￿nancial frictions and the left lower panel corresponds to a model without
￿nancial frictions.









































Figure 5: IRFs of government spending: the e⁄ect of various delays in the implementation.






























































Figure 6: Present value multiplier k-quarters ahead for government spending.
























































































































Figure 7: ARRA simulations for di⁄erent durations of the liquidity trap
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